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Non–technical summary
The importance of R&D as a main factor of sustainable growth in highly
industrialized economies is undisputable among economists. In recent years
a growing gap in the levels of research investment between Europe and the
US or Japan has been observed. European governments fear the negative
consequences for the long–run technological performance, growth and em-
ployment potential. For this reason, the 2002 EU member states agreed
on the so–called Barcelona objectives. On this basis, the “Action Plan for
Europe” has been proposed: the European R&D expenditure should be in-
creased from currently 1.9% of GDP to 3.0% by 2010, where two thirds
should be financed by the business sector, as its R&D spending is currently
lagging behind the U.S. and Japan. In order to achieve this goal, national
governments are requested to reinforce their national technology programs
to support R&D in the business sector.
In line with that task, this paper analyzes the effects of public R&D project
funding on private R&D expenditure and subsequently the effect of the pub-
licly induced R&D spending on the patenting behavior of firms empirically.
The presumed mechanism behind the European Action Plan is that pub-
lic incentives are expected to stimulate the private R&D engagement and
that such additionally induced R&D activities lead to new products and
processes improving the European technological performance. This is by
no means clear: every firm has an incentive to apply for subsidies and to
substitute public funding for private research investment. If full crowding–
out effects occur, public incentives would not lead to any improvement of
technological performance. Furthermore, it is not clear whether additional
R&D projects that have been conducted due to the receipt of subsidies lead
to successful results. Assuming that firms have some R&D project portfolio
to choose from, they will obviously start with those projects promising the
highest expected returns. Hence, publicly funded R&D projects will show
lower expected returns than purely privately financed ones; possibly due to
a higher outcome uncertainty. Thus, even if no crowding–out effects take
place, the technological and economic benefits of public funding are ques-
tionable. The central contribution of this paper is the empirical investigation
of the link between subsidies, the input side of the innovation process and
the impact on technological performance in a system of equations.
We use a large sample of German R&D performers from the manufacturing
sector to test the presumed mechanisms of the European Action Plan. Our
sample covers 3,799 firm–year observations of which 588 received subsidies.
Conducting a treatment effects analysis to investigate the crowding–out ver-
sus the complementarity hypothesis yields that we can reject full as well as
partial crowding–out effects. In fact, public incentive schemes seem to ac-
celerate the R&D spending in the business sector. In a second step, we
implement the results of the treatment effects analysis into a patent produc-
tion function, where R&D investment is disentangled into two components:
on one hand, the purely privately financed part of the total R&D budget
that firms would have spent in the absence of subsidies and, on the other
hand, the additionally induced R&D expenditure due to subsidies. We find
that both the purely financed R&D and the estimated treatment effect show
a positive impact on the patenting behavior of firms. Hence, we do not have
to reject the presumed mechanism in the European Action Plan. Public
policy initiatives indeed foster the private R&D engagement, so that meet-
ing the Action Plan’s 3% goal can actually be promoted by public policy.
Furthermore, it contributes to the ultimate goal of the Action Plan, namely
to increase Europe’s technological performance, as the regression analysis
reveals that even the publicly stimulated additional R&D leads to an in-
creased patenting activity.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of public R&D funding on R&D
expenditure and patenting behavior of German firms. The main focus
is the direct impact of subsidies on R&D and the indirect effect on
innovation output measured by patent applications. We distinguish
the productivity of purely privately financed R&D and additional R&D
induced by public incentive schemes. For this, a treatment effects
analysis is conducted in a first step. The results are implemented
into the estimation of a patent production function. It turns out that
both purely privately financed R&D and publicly induced R&D show
a positive productivity.
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1 Introduction
The importance of R&D as a main factor of sustainable growth in highly
industrialized economies is undisputable among economists. In recent years
a growing gap in the levels of research investment between Europe and its
main trading partners has been observed. For instance, the gap in research
investment between the European Union and the United States is already in
excess of EUR 120 billion per year and widening fast, with alarming conse-
quences for the long–run technological performance and, hence, for growth
and employment potential. For this reason, the 2002 EU member states
agreed on the so–called Barcelona objectives in order to bridge the growing
gap. The objective is to increase the average gross expenditure on research
and development (GERD) from 1.9% of GDP to 3.0% by 2010, of which
two thirds should be funded by the private sector. The research investment
slack in the business sector is seen as the major cause for the growing R&D
gap. While for some European economies like Finland, the threshold values
are already passed, Germany’s GERD as percentage of of GDP was at 2.5%
in 2001.
Based on the Barcelona objectives, the European Commission came up with
the “Action Plan for Europe” that proposes the national governments to re-
inforce their technology policy towards a stimulation of R&D spending of
the business sector (see European Commission, 2003). The presumed mecha-
nism behind the European Action Plan is that public incentives are expected
to increase the private R&D engagement in the business sector and that such
additionally induced R&D activities lead to new products and processes im-
proving the European technological performance. This is by no means clear:
First, every firm has an incentive to apply for subsidies and to substitute
public funding for private research investment. If full crowding–out effects
occur, public incentives would not lead to any improvement of technologi-
cal performance. Second, it is not clear a–priori whether additional R&D
projects that have been conducted due to the receipt of subsidies lead to
successful results. Assuming that firms have some R&D project portfolio
to choose from, they will obviously start with those projects promising the
highest expected returns. Hence, publicly funded R&D projects will show
lower expected returns than purely privately financed ones. Although those
may exhibit large social benefits, their associated uncertainty of outcome
will presumably be higher. Thus, even if no crowding–out effects take place,
the technological and economic benefits of public funding are questionable.
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In this paper, we analyze the mechanisms as presumed in the European Ac-
tion Plan at the firm level: the link between public funding and R&D input,
in the first step, and the relationship between R&D input and technologi-
cal performance in second step. Technological performance is measured by
patent applications, because this is a widely accepted indicator on countries’
technological potential and the patent outcome is depending on successfully
completed research projects.
The essential contribution to the literature is that we especially take into ac-
count the effect of additionally induced R&D due to public incentive schemes
on the firms’ patent productivity. Beforehand, researchers either analyzed
the input side or the output side of the innovation process. In this study,
however, the direct impact of subsidies on innovation input and the indirect
effect of subsidies on innovation output through possibly increased R&D
spending is explicitly modelled in a system of equations.
Positive effects of public funding on private R&D and a positive patent
outcome of the additionally induced R&D are necessary prerequisites for a
successful improvement of Europe’s technological performance and a posi-
tive assessment of technology policy. The following section describes and
motivates the setup of our empirical model. Section 3 presents our estima-
tion strategy on the basis of our model setup including a brief literature
review. The data and variables used to test the presumed relationships of
the Action Plan are introduced in Section 4. The estimation results are
discussed in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model Setup
There are clear economic rationales behind supporting private R&D: The
level of privately financed R&D activities is lower than socially desired, be-
cause R&D has the characteristics of a public good and generates positive
external effects, which cannot be internalized (see Arrow, 1962). Thus,
there may be projects that would have positive benefits to society, but do
not cover the private cost. As a result, these projects are not carried out and
the quantity of innovations is below the socially desirable level. This theory
is the main reason for governments to subsidize private R&D projects. Pub-
lic funding reduces the price for private investors and thus the innovations
are carried out. However, a firm has always an incentive to apply for public
R&D support, even if the private expected return is positive and it could
perform the R&D projects using its own financial means. If public support
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is granted, the firm then might simply substitute public for private invest-
ment. This possible crowding–out effect between public grants and private
investment has to be taken into account when public authorities decide on
the level of their engagement in R&D support programs. The crowding–out
versus the stimulation hypothesis is the first mechanism to be investigated
on the background of the European Action Plan 2010. Only if full crowding–
out effects can be rejected, total R&D activity is increased by governmental
incentive schemes.
In the second step, we investigate whether the additional R&D induced by
public policy leads to benefits in terms of technological performance. In
case of profit maximizing companies, we can assume that firms first conduct
those projects from their research portfolio that have highest expected prof-
its. The government’s aim with granting subsidies is to stimulate additional
R&D projects that possibly have high social returns, but do not cover private
cost.1 Suppose a firm decided to perform five different R&D projects with
positive expected profits. In case of the receipt of a subsidy, the government
wants the firm to launch a sixth project that had not been conducted in the
absence of public support. However, it is not clear if this additional projects
leads to positive benefits for society. If the firm initially had considered not
to conduct this project due to low or even negative private expected re-
turn, the project could be associated with a high risk of failure. Even if the
government expects high social returns, it is questionable whether the risk
of failure is appropriately taken into account in the Governments’ decision
process. Hence, even if no crowding–out effects occur, the publicly induced
additional R&D may not lead to a significant improvement of technologi-
cal performance, because a large share of such projects bear high risk and
might fail. This second mechanism is to be tested, if the ambitious task of
the European Action Plan wants to be fulfilled by 2010. A model that can
be used to test these relationships empirically may take following form:
First, we test for crowding–out effects by conducting a treatment analysis.
We estimate how much R&D subsidized firms would have conducted, on
average, if they had not been funded. This can be expressed by the average
treatment effect on the treated
αTT = E(αi) = E(R&DTi |S = 1)− E(R&DCi |S = 1) (1)
where R&DTi indicates the R&D expenditure in case of treatment, R&D
C
i
1Direct R&D project funding is the most important instrument in Germany’s technol-
ogy policy. There are no R&D tax credits in place.
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the counterfactual situation, and S ∈ {0, 1} indicates the treatment status
(receipt of subsidy). Thus the empirical test of the first mechanism implied
by the European Action Plan is whether αTT > 0. Our estimation strategy
will be outlined in Section 3.
Second, even if we find evidence for αTT > 0, it is not clear that the public
efforts lead to new technologies. In case of frequent failures of the addi-
tional R&D projects, public policy would not improve the development of
new products and processes. In order to assess the effect of R&D on new
technologies, we analyze patent applications in this second step. Patents are
a widely accepted indicator for technological performance and international
comparisons of such (see Griliches, 1990, or OECD, 1994). Unfortunately,
one cannot observe the breakdown of R&D activity into purely privately
financed projects and those projects that have been induced by public pol-
icy. Note that it is not sufficient to split the R&D expenditure into the
amount of the subsidy and the private proportion, because if a subsidy is
granted in Germany it is given as matching grants, that is, the firm can
apply with a specific project and in case of successful review process, the
Government pays some share of the total cost, usually between 30 and 50%.
So it is important to disentangle the R&D expenditure into R&DCi and αi
as indicated in eq. (1). The first term denotes the research engagement of
the firm in the absence of a treatment and αi comprises of the subsidy and
the additionally financed R&D of the firm. Thus, the second equation to be
estimated can be written as
PATENTi = f(R&DCi , αi, other firm characteristics) (2)
The empirical assessment of the second mechanism, namely that public pol-
icy incentive schemes create knowledge and improve the technological perfor-
mance, amounts to testing whether αi is significantly positively influencing
the patent outcome.
3 Literature Review and Estimation strategies
Literature on the crowding–out effects
The evaluation of public funding is not new in industrial economic context.
David et al. (2000) and Klette et al. (2000) survey the existing literature
on the effects of public R&D grants on private R&D spending at differ-
ent aggregation levels. They conclude that the majority of the considered
studies find a complementary relationship of privately and publicly financed
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R&D. However, one major criticism of David et al. and Klette et al. on
former studies is the disregard of a possible selection bias. If, for exam-
ple, the government follows a picking–the–winner strategy, it will subsidize
those firms that are highly innovative and successful. Hence a mean com-
parison of R&D expenditure between recipients and non–recipients would
yield biased results, as such firms may have very different characteristics.
Since then, some studies take the selection bias into account: Busom (2000)
applies Heckman–type selection models and rejects full-crowding out, but
finds partial crowding–out effects for Spain; Wallsten (2000) employs simul-
taneous equations to model R&D expenditure and subsidies. Using a 3SLS
estimator, he finds a substitutive effect of R&D grants from SBIR program
in the US; Lach (2002) applies the difference–in–difference estimator and
dynamic panel data models for Israel and identifies large positive effects for
small firms, but insignificant effects in his full sample; Czarnitzki (2001),
Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), as well as Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) employ
matching approaches to investigate the impact of public subsidies in Ger-
many, and they reject full crowding–out in Eastern German manufacturing
and in the German service sector; Hussinger (2003) explores semiparametric
selection models and applies them to a similar dataset used in this paper.
She confirms the positive results previously identified with German data;
Duguet (2004) employs the matching methodology with a large panel of
French firms covering the years 1985 to 1997. Controlling for past public
support the firms benefited from, he also rejects the crowding out hypothesis
for France. Gonza´lez et al. (2004) investigate subsidies in a panel of more
than 2,000 Spanish manufacturing firms and employ a simultaneous equa-
tion model. They state that subsidies are effective in inducing firms to invest
into R&D, but they induce only slight changes in the level of R&D expen-
diture. They conclude that in the absence of subsidies, publicly supported
R&D projects would be carried out, although in smaller size. However, they
do not report crowding–out effects or inefficient use of subsidies. In sum-
mary, the majority of recent studies report complimentary effects of public
R&D, but crowding–out effects, especially partial ones, cannot be ruled out.
Estimation strategy to assess the crowding–out hypothesis
The modern econometric evaluation techniques have been developed to iden-
tify treatment effects when the available observations on individuals or firms
are subject to a selection bias. This typically occurs when participants in
public measures differ from non–participants in important characteristics.
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Popular economic studies are on the benefit of active labor market policies.2
The literature on the econometrics of evaluation offers different estimation
strategies to correct for selection bias (see Heckman et al., 1997, Heckman
et al. 1999 for a survey) including the difference–in–difference estimator,
control function approaches (selection models), IV estimation and non–
parametric matching. The difference–in–difference method requires panel
data with observations before and after/while the treatment (change of sub-
sidy status). As our database (to be described in the following section)
consists of cross–sections, we cannot apply this estimator. For the appli-
cation of IV estimators and selection models one needs valid instruments
for the treatment variables. It is very difficult in our case to find possible
candidates being convincingly used as instruments. Therefore, we choose
the matching estimator. Its main advantage over IV and selection models is
that we neither have to assume any functional form for the outcome equa-
tion nor is a distributional assumption on the error terms of the selection
equation and the outcome equation necessary. The disadvantage is that it
does only control for observed heterogeneity among treated and untreated
firms. However, as we discuss in the next section, we think that our set of co-
variates allows us to assume that selection on unobservable effects is unlikely.
As said above, we choose a matching estimator to estimate the average
treatment effect on the treated as shown in eq. (1).3 Building on the
conditional independence assumption (Rubin, 1974, 1977), one can estimate
the counterfactual situation by using a selected group of non–subsidized
firms that have similar characteristics X:
E(R&DC |X,S = 1) = E(R&DC |X,S = 0). (3)
The construction of the control group depends on the chosen matching al-
gorithm. In this paper, we choose a nearest neighbor matching, that is,
for each subsidized firm, we search for the most similar firms in terms of
the characteristics X in the potential control group. As X contains several
elements, it is virtually impossible to find twin firms that exactly show the
same characteristics as the treated firms. A popular method to circumvent
this problem of the “curse of dimensionality” is based on Rosenbaum and
2See Klette et al. (2000: 479–482) for a discussion of the selection problem in the
context of R&D subsidies.
3A detailed discussion of the matching methodology is beyond the scope of this paper.
See, for example, Angrist (1998), Dehejia and Wahba (1999), Heckman et al. (1998a,
1998b), and Lechner (1999, 2000). A discussion of matching in the context of R&D
subsidies can be found in Almus and Czarnitzki (2003).
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Rubin (1983). They have shown that it is sufficient to match on the propen-
sity score P (X), that is, the probability to receive subsidies in our case.
Using this single scalar measure in the matching routine ensures that the
samples of treated and non–treated firms are, on average, statistically not
different in X. As the propensity score is not observed, it has to estimated.
One precondition for the matching to be consistent is the common support
assumption, that is, for each subsidized firm, there has to be a sufficiently
similar non–treated firm in the potential control group. In practice, the
samples are usually restricted to common support. If, however, the loss of
observations is too large, the matching is not appropriate to estimate αTT .
See Table 1 for a more detailed description of the matching algorithm used
in this study.
The patent production function
The relationship between R&D and patenting has been broadly analyzed in
the economic literature since the 1980s. Pakes and Griliches (1984) argue
that patents have the advantage to occur at an intermediate stage of the
transformation process from R&D input to R&D output. Thereby patents
indicate successful R&D and separate this intermediate R&D outcome from
the profit generating part of the innovative process.
In the literature, patents are mainly considered as a function of the firms’
contemporaneous and lagged R&D expenditure. Hall et al. (1986) analyze
the lag structure between R&D expenditure and patenting. They confirm
the result of Pakes and Griliches (1984) that there is the strongest weight on
the contemporaneous relationship between R&D expenditure and patenting,
and they further conclude that the contribution of the observed R&D his-
tory to the contemporaneous patent applications is quite small.
Besides R&D, the specification of the patent production function is usually
not very rich. R&D expenditure is the most important input factor catch-
ing also strategic aspects, and industry dummies and time dummies are
usually included in order to control for technology differences among indus-
tries (their average patent propensity) and changes in the macroeconomic
patenting behavior. Other regressors are rather sparingly used.4
The only studies on research productivity measured by patents and tech-
4Examples are spill–over measures (cf. Jaffe, 1986, Cincera, 1997); or the book value
of firms (cf. Hall et al., 1986)
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Table 1: The matching protocol
1. Estimate the propensity score P (x′iβ) and restrict the sample to common support:
delete all observations on treated firms with probabilities larger than the maximum
and smaller than the minimum in the potential control group.
2. Select a firm i that received public R&D funding.
3. Take the estimated propensity score P (x′βˆ). In many empirical studies one wants
to balance the participants and control observations with regard to more charac-
teristics than the propensity score. Firm size is an example. Therefore one uses,
additionally to the propensity score, a vector ν (where ν is a subset of X) that
contains important matching variables. This variant is called hybrid matching (see
Lechner, 1998).
4. Then one calculates a proper measure of metric distance, e.g. the Mahalanobis
distance. Let:
dij =
(
P (x′iβˆ), νi
)
−
(
P (x′j βˆ), νj
)
∀ j = 1, . . . , NC
for every combination of the R&D recipient i and every firm from the potential
control group j. Then calculate the Mahalanobis distance:
MDij = dij ′ Ω−1 dij ∀ j = 1, . . . , NC
to find the nearest neighbor. Ω represents the covariance matrix based on the
controls, i.e. firms that did not receive public subsidies.
5. After calculating the distance, one possibly wants to impose additional restric-
tions on the neighborhood. For instance, we require that for being a neighbor
of participant i, a potential control firm has to be recorded in the same indus-
try classification. Firms in other industries are deleted from the potential control
group.
6. The firm j from the potential control group with the smallest distance serves as
control observation in the following outcome analysis. The comparison observation
is drawn randomly if more than one firm attains the minimum distance.
7. Remove the i–th firm from the pool of firms that received subsidies but return
the selected control observation to the pool of control observations. This is done
because of the relatively limited number of control firms. Using different data, i.e.
a larger potential control group, one could also draw without replacement.
8. Repeat steps 2 to 7 to find matched pairs for all recipients.
9. Once a control observation has been picked for each subsidized firm, one can
calculate the mean difference between the treatment group and the selected control
group:
αˆTT = 1
NT
(∑NT
i=1R&D
T
i −
∑NT
i=1 R̂&D
C
i
)
.
As we perform sampling with replacement to estimate the counterfactual situa-
tion, an ordinary t–statistic is biased, because it does not take the appearance of
repeated observations into account. Therefore, we have to correct the standard
errors in order to draw conclusions on statistical inference. We follow Lechner
(2001) and calculate his estimator for an asymptotic approximation of the stan-
dard errors.
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nology policy are Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998, 2002). They study the
performance of Japanese research consortia which are heavily subsidized.
Branstetter and Sakakibara investigate if the subsidy, that is, being a mem-
ber in one of the subsidized research consortia, increases research produc-
tivity of Japanese companies with respect to patent applications in the US.
In order to do that they, for example, regress the patents on R&D and the
consortia dummy in the 1998 paper. Branstetter and Sakakibara find a pos-
itively significant coefficient of the consortia dummy, and conclude that the
subsidies have a positive impact on research productivity due to spill–over
effects that are generated within the consortia. The set up of our model is
different: the subsidy affects primarily R&D activity and reveals the benefit
only in the second step from R&D projects to patents.
Building on the results of Pakes and Griliches as well as on Hall et al., we use
a cross–sectional approach with the contemporaneous R&D expenditure ac-
counting also for the innovative history. As R&D exhibits high adjustment
costs, it is quite constant over time, and thus the current R&D spending
is also a good approximation of the previous R&D engagement of firms.
Jaffe (1986) does also estimate cross–sectional regressions to investigate the
relationship between patents and R&D. The most common approach to es-
timate patent production functions is count data models. In this paper, a
negative binomial regression model is chosen to analyze the impact of the
two R&D components on the number of patent application.5 In addition we
also estimate a probit model on the propensity to file at least one patent.
4 Data and Empirical Considerations
Our final database results from linking different sources at the firm level.
Company information is taken from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP),6
which is an annual survey conducted by the Centre for European Economic
Research (ZEW) on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Education
and Research (BMBF) since 1992. However, many firms are only observed
once, because the participation in the survey is not mandatory and many
firms are reluctant to publish information voluntarily. For example, in our fi-
nal sample more than 50% of the companies are only observed once. For this
reason, we conduct a pooled cross-sectional analysis rather than a panel–
5Panel approaches that address the count data nature of the patent applications and
individual effects are provided e.g. by Hausman et al. (1984) and Blundell et al. (2002).
6See Janz et al. (2001) for a detailed description of the MIP.
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econometric approach.
Information on the direct project funding of the German Federal Govern-
ment is taken from the PROFI database of the BMBF, which contains in-
formation on all civilian R&D projects that have been funded since 1980.
Additionally, the database of the German Patent and Trade Mark Office
(GPTO) is used. It contains information on all patent applications in Ger-
many since 1979. Linking the PROFI database and the patent database to
the MIP required a text field search by firm names and addresses. Finally,
some information like the firms’ age, legal form and major shareholding are
taken from the Creditreform database.7 Some industry data is taken from
the OECD STAN database and from the annual reports from the German
antitrust commission.
The combination of the MIP and the PROFI database allows us to iden-
tify different categories of firms: first, companies that have received public
funding from the German Federal Government, second, companies that have
received R&D subsidies from other sources like the German La¨nder or the
European Union and, third, companies that did not receive any public R&D
grants. As we are interested in the public funding by the Federal Govern-
ment, we drop the second group of firms. Hence, the firms in the potential
control group are non–funded firms and we can rule–out side effects of other
programs, especially those by the EU, that may have led to an underesti-
mation of treatment effects. Our study focuses on R&D performers in the
manufacturing sector and takes firms from at least five employees into ac-
count. Due to the proposed matching estimator, we drop a very few huge
firms that are definitely unique in the economy, and it would not be sensible
to construct a control group for such firms. Thus, the study is restricted
to firms with 3,000 employees at most. The final sample covers the period
from 1992 to 2000 and comprises of 3,779 firm–year observations of which
588 refer to recipients of public R&D funding by the German Federal Gov-
ernment. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables used.
Endogenous variables in the first stage of the analysis are the firms’ funding
status and the R&D expenditure (in million DM) as defined in the Frascati
Manual (OECD, 1993). We distinguish two variables: RDit includes the
private investment as well as the subsidies. NETRDit is equal to RD net
the amount of subsidies.8 As a further robustness check of our results, we
7Creditreform is the largest German credit rating agency.
8For convenience we omit the subscript it in the following. All variables are at the firm
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
funded firms non–funded firms
# of observations: NT = 588 NC = 3, 191 mean
variables mean std. dev. mean std. dev. difference
PATENT 3.52 6.82 1.18 3.45 2.35***
D(PATENT > 0) 0.47 0.50 0.26 0.44 0.21***
RD 4.11 5.69 1.76 3.69 2.35***
RD/SALES 6.23 7.58 3.13 4.85 3.09***
NETRD 3.86 5.60 1.76 3.69 2.09***
NETRD/SALES 5.31 6.35 3.13 4.85 2.17***
PS/EMP (lagged) 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01***
ln(EMP ) 5.67 1.23 5.03 1.34 0.65***
EAST 0.36 0.48 0.16 0.36 0.21***
ln(AGE) 2.85 1.33 3.07 1.23 -0.22***
GROUP 0.33 0.47 0.12 0.33 0.20***
FOREIGN 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.12 0.03***
CAPCOM 0.97 0.00 0.94 0.01 0.03***
EXPORT 0.32 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.07***
IMPORT (lagged) 0.31 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.03***
HHI (lagged) 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.01***
*** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
The samples also differ significantly in the distribution over industries and
time (6 time and 12 industry dummies not presented).
also consider the R&D intensities measured as R&D expenditure divided by
sales (RD/Sales×100 and NETRD/Sales×100 ) These two variable allow
us, to test different hypotheses:
• H1 : Full crowding–out
The use of RD allows us, to test for full crowding–out. Suppose “the
average firm” decided on its R&D budget for the business year and it is
set to 100 currency units (CU). However, the firm gets aware of public
funding opportunities, files an application, and receives a subsidy of
20 CU for an additional R&D project. Full crowding–out would imply
that the firm still spends 100 CU on R&D including the subsidy. If
we find a significant treatment effect in the variable RD, we can thus
reject the hypothesis of full crowding–out, on average.
• H2 : Partial crowding–out
Similarly we can test for partial crowding–out using NETRD. Again
suppose the average firm received a subsidy of 20 CU, and we actually
observe 100 CU of NETRD. If the treatment effect in NETRD is
level unless stated otherwise.
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not negative, we do not have to reject the null hypothesis of no partial
crowding–out.
• H3 : Acceleration effect
Finally, if we find that the average treatment effect on the treated in
NETRD is significantly positive, we can reject the hypothesis of no
accelerating effect of the subsidies, because the average firm spends
more than the amount of subsidies received in case of treatment than
in the absence of a treatment.
In the second stage, we disentangle RD into the counterfactual situation
RDC and the additionally induced R&D, αTT (the subsidy and the accel-
erated private investment). The endogenous variables in this stage are the
number of patent applications PATENT and a dummy variable indicating
firms that filed at least one patent, D(PATENT > 0). This forms our
fourth hypothesis on technological progress or performance:
• H4: The additional technological progress induced by public incen-
tives
In case of the support of an acceleration effect (H3) it may indeed
be possible that subsidies increase the technological performance in
Germany. To test this hypothesis, we consider a “patent production
function” and investigate whether a possibly positive treatment effect,
that has been estimated before, contributes positively and significantly
to patent applications of firms. If we find this effect, we do not have
to reject the presumptions of the European Action Plan 2010, namely
that policy incentive schemes can actively increase Europe’s techno-
logical performance.
The further factors in Table 2 are treated as exogenous regressors: The log of
the number of employees in thousands, (ln(EMP )), controls for size effects.
The dummy variable EAST indicates firms that are located in Eastern Ger-
many. Due to the German reunification in 1990, Eastern Germany is still
in transition from a planned economy to a market economy, and the firm
behavior may be different. For instance, most firms were newly founded
since the reunification and they are on average smaller than Western Ger-
man firms. Moreover, Eastern German firms are preferred in the policy
incentive schemes, and special schemes have been launched exclusively for
such in order to accelerate the catching–up process in this region. The log of
firm age (ln(AGE)) controls for additional maturity effects. On one hand,
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younger firms may be more likely to receive subsidies, because in Germany
exist special start–up programs. On the other hand, older companies may
be more experienced in R&D and applying for subsidies, ceteris paribus.
A very important variable in the estimation of the propensity score of the
subsidy receipt is the patent stock (PS). The patent stock is generated
from a series of patent applications (timed by application date) since 1980
for every firm and approximates the past R&D activities of a firm. Previous
successful R&D is assumed to positively influence the probability of receiv-
ing subsidies. The stock of patents is generated by the perpetual inventory
method as
PSit = (1− δ)PSi,t−1 + PAt
where PA denotes the number of patent applications by firm i in year t and
δ is the constant depreciation rate of knowledge which is set to δ = 0.15
as common in the literature (see, for example, Hall, 1990, or Griliches and
Mairesse, 1984, who have shown that the magnitude of the assumed rate
of obsolescence had almost no effect in the estimation of the relationship
between productivity and the R&D capital stock). The patent stock enters
the regression as PS/EMP in order to reduce collinearity with firm size.
Moreover, we use the lagged patent stock of t− 2 to avoid endogeneity with
current R&D.
The dummyGROUP indicates firms that belong to a group and FOREIGN
is a subset of GROUP referring to companies belonging to a group with
a foreign parent company. This variables control for different governance
structures. Firms that belong to a group may be more likely to receive
subsidies because they presumably have better access to information about
governmental actions due to their network linkages. In contrast, if firms
belong to a group with a foreign parent company, it may be the case that
the group tends to file applications in its home country or that, due to the
foreign ownership, a German subsidiary does not qualify for the federal tech-
nology programs.
We also control for competition. The export quota (EXPORT = ex-
ports/sales) measures the degree of international competition a firm faces.
Firms that engage in foreign markets may be more innovative than oth-
ers and, hence, are more likely to apply for subsidies. IMPORT denotes
the import intensity (= imports/(imports plus domestic production)) and
is measured at the 2–digit industry level. Furthermore, the Hirschmann–
Herfindahl–Index (HHI) represents the domestic sellers concentration on
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the 3–digit industry level. These variables capture differences in competi-
tion among industries. Note that we use lagged values to avoid simultaneity
problems.
A dummy variable for capital companies (CAPCOM) indicates for firms
with liability limiting legal form.9 Firms with such legal forms are regis-
tered in the German trade register. This may have an influence on the
funding probability as firms are required to prove that they are business
active at the time of application. Being included in the trade register serves
as such evidence. Other firms like joint partnerships have to fulfill this re-
quirement differently. As the authorities may be risk averse, they possibly
tend to prefer registered companies for funding. Finally, twelve industry
dummies control for non–observed differences among industries as well as
six time dummies capture changes in the macroeconomic environment.
Comparing the samples of publicly funded and non–funded firms before the
matching as presented in Table 2 shows that there exist significant mean
differences in all variables used. This points to the fact that the recipients
of subsidies are a selective sample. For example, the funded firms are larger,
have a higher patent stock per employee, and also achieve higher export quo-
tas, on average. In addition, they spend significantly more on R&D than
non–funded firms. However, the research question followed in the upcoming
matching process is whether these differences in R&D spending can be as-
signed to the receipt of subsidies.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 The funding probability
We start with the estimation of the propensity score P (x′iβ) which is sub-
sequently used in the matching algorithm to obtain the average treatment
effect on the treated, α. Table 3 shows the estimation results of the probit
model on the receipt of subsidies. The marginal effects are calculated at the
sample means, and their standard errors are obtained by the delta method.
Large firms are more likely to be considered in the federal technology pro-
grams. They conduct presumably more R&D projects than smaller firms
and are able to apply for public R&D support with several proposals. Better
9It corresponds to the German legal forms: GmbH, GmbH&Co.KG, and AG.
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Table 3: Probit estimation on the receipt of public R&D funding
variables coefficient std. err. marg. effectsa std.err.
PS/EMP (lagged) 3.09*** 0.58 0.70*** 0.10
ln(EMP ) 0.32*** 0.03 0.06*** 0.00
EAST 1.23*** 0.14 0.33*** 0.05
ln(AGE) 0.10*** 0.03 0.02*** 0.01
GROUP 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.03
FOREIGN -0.19 0.18 -0.02 0.03
CAPCOM 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.03
EXPORT 0.25* 0.13 0.04* 0.02
IMPORT (lagged) 0.17 0.32 0.03 0.06
HHI (lagged) -0.29 0.44 -0.05 0.08
Constant term -4.33*** 0.30
Tests on joint significance
Industry dummies χ2(12) = 148.14 ***
Time dummies χ2(6) = 46.75 ***
# of obs. 3,779
Log Likelihood -1,297.72
McFadden R2 0.2056
*** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
a) Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means.
developed structures of information and organization may contribute as well
to the higher propensity and large firms may have advantages in answering
the bureaucratic demands of the application process. Firms’ age also has
a positive impact on the probability to receive a subsidy. Therefore, we
conclude that the experience argument and also a firm’s track record out-
weighs the existence of special start–up programs, on average. Firms that
have been innovative in the past, as measured by the lagged patent stock
per employee, achieve a higher probability to receive public support than
other firms. This result reflects possibly the strongest selection criterion
by the Federal Government besides the review of the submitted propos-
als. Public authorities seek to maximize the expected social return of the
subsidies. Thus, applicants showing previous successful R&D projects are
preferred over other firms, because it is expected that such firms maintain
more knowledge capital and experience, so that the probability of a com-
plete failure of the targeted research is very low.
As expected, the EAST dummy is significantly positive reflecting the larger
supply of public incentive schemes in Eastern Germany in order to foster
the catching–up process. EXPORT is the only competition measure which
is, at least weakly, significant in the regression. Firms that face higher inter-
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national competition are, on one hand, possibly more relying on innovative
products, and are therefore more likely to apply for public grants. On the
other hand, this may reflect the Federal Government’s goal to strengthen
Germany’s international competitiveness. Furthermore, the industry dum-
mies and the time dummies are both jointly significant at the 1% level. The
variables controlling for different governance structures do not have any im-
pact on the funding probability.
As we find highly significant industry differences, but also several insignif-
icant variables, we decided to use some interaction terms of the significant
variables and the industry dummies in order to achieve a better fit of the
model and, thus, a better approximation of the conditional independence
assumption needed for the upcoming matching procedure. In particular, we
added interactions of the patent stock with EAST , firm size interacted with
EAST , and interactions of all industry dummies with firm size. A likelihood
ratio test of the model including these interaction terms and the model pre-
sented in Table 3 reveals that the additional regressors add to the fit: the
LR–statistic amounts to 47.38 and is distributed χ2(14). As the interaction
terms are jointly significant at the 1% level, we use the extended model to
predict the propensity score.
5.2 Estimation of the average treatment effect on the treated
In the second step, the impact of the public R&D project funding on firms
R&D spending is estimated. Initially, we used only the propensity score
as the matching argument, but it turned out that the matching quality is
significantly improved when the firm size (LN(EMP )) is also included in
the matching function. Recall that for a potential control observation to
be picked as a nearest neighbor, it is also required to operate in the same
industry as the corresponding treated firm (see Table 1). Given these re-
quirements and our relatively large set of covariates, especially including the
innovation history of firms measured by the patent stock, and the inclusion
of several interaction terms to take industry specificities into account, we
assume that the conditional independence assumption is fulfilled in our ap-
plication of the matching methodology. Unfortunately, this assumption is
not testable.
Imposing the common support only leads to a loss of 15 observation on sub-
sidized firms for which no appropriate control observation is included in the
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sample of non–treated companies (see Step 1 in Table 1). As this amounts
only to 2.6% of the subsidy recipients, the application of the matching
methodology is justified with respect to the large common support among
both groups, in our opinion.
Table 4: Results of the NN–matchinga
funded firms non–funded firms
# of observations: NT = 573 NC = 573
variables mean mean mean diff. std. err.b
PS (lagged) 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
ln(EMP ) 5.68 5.67 0.01 0.09
EAST 0.35 0.36 -0.01 0.04
ln(AGE) 2.87 2.87 0.00 0.10
GROUP 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.03
CAPCOM 0.97 0.97 0.00 0.01
FOREIGN 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01
EXPORT 0.32 0.31 0.01 0.02
IMPORT 0.31 0.30 0.01 0.02
HHI 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.01
Propensity Score P (x′iβ) 0.32 0.32 0.00
RD 4.11 2.96 1.15*** 0.38
RD/Sales× 100 6.26 4.37 1.89*** 0.52
NETRD 3.86 2.96 0.90** 0.37
NETRD/Sales× 100 5.34 4.37 0.97** 0.49
Matching results for SMEs (firms with 500 employees at most)
# of observations: NT = 234 NC = 234
RD 1.24 0.75 0.49*** 0.13
RD/Sales× 100 10.22 6.14 4.08*** 1.12
NETRD 1.08 0.75 0.33*** 0.13
NETRD/Sales× 100 8.29 6.14 2.15** 1.06
*** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
a The matching function includes the estimated propensity score and ln(EMP ),
and the selected controls are recorded in the same industry as the corresponding
subsidized firm. The samples are also balanced with respect to time
(6 time dummies not presented).
b Standard errors account for sampling with replacement (see Lechner, 2001).
For the remaining 573 observations in the group of treated firms, we find ap-
propriate twins. As a first test whether the matching has been successful, we
re–estimate the selection equation as presented in Table 3 including the in-
teraction terms, but with the matched sample. We expect that a Likelihood
Ratio test on joint significance of all coefficient should not reject the null
hypothesis. The statistic is distributed χ2(42) and amounts to LR = 11.79
17
which is insignificant, and we can conclude that the matching balanced the
samples sufficiently well. As a further check, we also conduct t–tests on mean
differences for all variables (including time dummies). As Table 4 reports
there are no significant differences in the exogenous firm characteristics and
in the estimated propensity score after the matching (see the upper part of
Table 4).
Although there is no significant difference with respect to the exogenous
characteristics between both groups, the R&D expenditure of the funded
firms is significantly larger. This effect can be assigned to the public fund-
ing. Going back to our main hypotheses (see Section 3), we reject the
first hypothesis (H1) of full-crowding out effects, because we find a signif-
icant treatment effect on the treated with respect to RD at the 1% level:
αTTRD = 4.11 − 2.96 = 1.15. The effects for the R&D intensity are also
significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, we test our hypotheses H2 and
H3 jointly using NETRD: The average treatment effect on the treated is
αTTNETRD = 3.86 − 2.96 = 0.90 which is significant at the 5% level. This
result also holds for the specification as Net–R&D intensity.
Consequently, we conclude that the subsidized firms do not only spend the
volume of the subsidy additionally on R&D, but do also raise further private
funds if they receive public support. In fact, we do not have to reject the
assumed mechanism by the European Action Plan that recipient firms add
new projects to their R&D portfolio when they receive a subsidy. While they
receive a proportion of the total project cost as a grant (usually 30 to 50%),
they increase their private investment, too. Note, however, that we can only
state that there is some accelerator effect, but cannot tell whether the firms
raise the additional share to be financed completely from new sources. It
still might happen that the recipients increase the private investment not
by the total remaining cost to be financed for the additional project, but
only raise their net investment by a “significantly larger than zero” amount
and make the rest of the necessary funds available by some reallocation of
their R&D project portfolio. In summary, we conclude that the hypothesis
of partial crowding–out can be rejected in our analysis and we can confirm
that the R&D subsidies lead in fact to an acceleration effect in Germany.
One argument might be that the subsidy remarkably reduces the economic
risk of the targeted projects so that firms achieve a better position to raise
external capital to finance R&D projects. Lerner (1999) pointed out that
a grant in US SBIR program served as a quality certificate especially for
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small and medium–sized enterprises in order to acquire new bank loans.
Such mechanism may be at work in Germany, too.
Motivated by this hypothesis, we re–estimated the probit model and the
matching for a subsample of small and medium–sized firms only (firms with
500 employees at most). This subsample contains 2,168 observations, and
the matched samples consist of 234 observations each. The different test
statistics indicate that the matching is as successful as in the full sample’s
case. The results of the estimation are presented in the lower part of Table
4. Again, we can reject the crowding–out hypotheses. In the full sample,
the “acceleration effect” (H3) of public funding amounts to an increase on
30% of net–R&D investment (αTT /NETRDC = 0.90/2.96). In the sample
of SMEs, however, this effect is 44% (αTTSME/NETRD
C
SME = 0.33/0.75). In
fact, it turns out that the small firms increase their private investment well
above the average when they are considered in public incentive schemes.
As it is commonly agreed in the economic literature that smaller firms are
more financially constrained than larger firms (see e.g. the survey on the
financing of R&D by Hall, 2002), we find support for Lerner’s statement
that the governmental approval of a research proposal serves also as quality
certificate for other external financiers.
5.3 The effect on technological progress
Since, we have shown that the federal subsidies indeed accelerate R&D
spending in Germany, we now turn to the second major research question
in this paper, that is, if the additionally induced R&D leads to technologi-
cal progress as presumed by the European Action Plan 2010. We measure
technological progress or performance as the patent activity at the firm level.
As dependent variables the number of patent applications per year (PAT −
ENT ) and a dummy whether a firm filed at least one patent per year
(D(PATENT > 0)) are chosen. Obviously, R&D spending is the most
important input factor for the “patent production function”. We use the
results of the foregoing matching procedure to disentangle the different com-
ponents of R&D investment in this stage: R̂D
C
represents the part of the
total R&D expenditure that the firms would have invested anyway, that is,
in absence of subsidies. Note that R̂D
C
is just equal to RD for the non–
recipient firms. In addition, the treatment effect on the treated αTT is the
additionally induced R&D (the subsidy plus the additionally induced private
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Table 5: Estimation of the patent outcome equations
number of patent applications patent probability
(negbin regression) (probit model)
full sample SME full sample SME
variables coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
(std. err.)+ (std. err.)+ (std. err.)+ (std. err.)+
R̂D
C
0.24*** 0.63*** 0.10*** 0.26***
(0.02) (0.09) (0.01) (0.04)
αTT 0.16*** 0.39*** 0.10*** 0.26***
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
EAST -0.90*** -0.39** -0.46*** -0.18***
(0.12) (0.15) (0.07) (0.08)
Tests on joint significance
Ind. dummies χ2(12) 157.52*** 32.61*** 160.09*** 52.41***
Time dummies χ2(6) 14.62** 15.47** 6.79 12.61**
# obs. 3,764 2,168 3,764 2,168
Log Likelihood -4,641.48 -1,446.02 -1,971.71 -869.57
McFadden R2 0.0680 0.0436 0.1326 0.0831
*** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
+ standard errors are bootstrapped.
research investment). For the non–subsidized firms this variable takes the
value zero by construction. In addition to these two variables, we control
for industry differences in patenting behavior by using the twelve industry
dummies, and also include the six time dummies controlling for intertempo-
ral changes in patenting behavior. The dummy variable EAST accounts for
a possibly lower average patenting activity of the still developing Eastern
German economy. We present bootstrapped standard errors as the R&D
measures are estimated figures (for the treated firms) and thus ordinary
standard errors would be biased downward. We used 200 replications of the
procedure to estimate the bootstrap standard errors.
The results of negative binomial regressions for the patent counts and of
probit models for the patent dummy are presented in Table 5. Note that for
the negative binomial model, we tested for overdispersion in both samples
and the LR statistics reveal that a poisson model is rejected in both cases.
The R&D expenditure in the counterfactual situation R̂D
C
and the treat-
ment effect exhibit a statistically significant and positive impact on both
the patenting decision and the number of patent applications. Only in the
case of the count data model, tests yield that the hypothesis of equal coef-
ficients of R̂D
C
and αTT is rejected (χ2(1) = 16.56[32.61] in the full [SME]
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Table 6: Estimation of the patent outcome equations: marginal effects
number of patent applications patent probability
(negbin regression) (probit model)
variables full sample SME full sample SME
R̂D
C
0.20*** 0.18*** 0.03*** 0.06***
αTT 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.03*** 0.06***
EAST -0.59*** -0.10** -0.14*** -0.04***
sample). Further results are a significant lower patent activity for East-
ern Germany, and the industry and time dummies are jointly significant in
most regressions (except the six time dummies in the probit regression using
the full sample). The lower patenting activity in Eastern Germany might
have several reasons: first, a more on imitation based R&D strategy that
is focused on catching–up with Western Germany and other countries, or
second, a lack of knowledge with respect to the patent system and related
organizational issues, or third, just smaller average firm size. As a further
robustness test, we re–estimated the model including the log of firm age, firm
size (measured by six size dummies instead of a continuous variable in order
to reduce multi–collinearity with R&D spending and firm age) and the ex-
port quota. Firm size and age are included to control for the experience and
general propensity to use patents for the protection of intellectual property,
and exports control for the different competitiveness of firms which perhaps
is reflected in the originality of their research. We find that the larger the
firms, or the older the firms and the more export–oriented the firms are,
the more patents they file (not presented in detail). The coefficients of the
R&D variables change only marginally (downwards) and the interpretation
with respect to R&D and technology policy is the same. Note that the
EAST dummy remains significant in all regressions. Thus the patenting
gap between Western and Eastern Germany cannot be easily explained by
conventional measures like firm size and age. A more detailed investigation
on the determinants explaining this gap is beyond the scope of this paper
and remains for further research.
Table 6 presents the marginal effects at the mean of the explanatory vari-
ables. As the results show, the marginal effects of the R&D terms are always
significant. On average, the marginal effect in the count data model is 0.2
for the purely privately financed R&D and 0.14 for the additionally induced
R&D stimulated by subsidies. The effect of the private R&D expenditure
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is thus slightly higher than that of the publicly induced R&D expenditure.
This holds also true for the sample of SMEs, but the effects on patents are
somewhat smaller, on average. In the probit model, however, the reverse
is the case: the marginal effects to file at least one patent are larger for
the smaller companies (conditional on a lower average patent propensity, of
course). In both samples there is no differences between the two R&D com-
ponents. It seems that the public incentive schemes are a good instrument
to get firms to patent. They are as efficient as purely privately financed
R&D. Again, this points to the hypothesis of financial constraints. For in-
stance, companies that show a good track record of successful research are
possibly able to finance their activities by both internal and external capital.
A considerable proportion of other firms, however, might have good project
proposals, but they are not able to raise external capital on the market.
The receipt of subsidies reduces the financial constraints and firms are able
to conduct the desired research projects which in the end even qualify for
patents. This is also emphasized by the larger marginal effects in the probit
regression using the SME subsample. In conclusion, we find that both the
purely privately financed R&D (R̂D
C
) as well as the additionally stimulated
R&D spending or exhibit a positive impact on patenting activity. Hence,
the main results of our study is that public policy schemes lead indeed to
an increased technological performance in the economy.
6 Conclusions
The “European Action Plan 2010” aims at strengthening the technological
performance and thus the international competitiveness to secure long–term
employment in European member states. Therefore, the 2002 EU member
states agreed on the idea to raise the European R&D expenditure from cur-
rently 1.9% of GDP to 3.0% by 2010 in the European Community. In order
to achieve this goal, national governments are requested to reinforce their
national technology programs to support research and development in the
business sector.
In line with that task, this paper analyzes the effects of public R&D project
funding on R&D expenditure and subsequently the effect of the publicly
induced R&D spending on the patenting behavior of German firms. Con-
ducting a treatment effects analysis to study the crowding–out versus the
complementarity hypothesis yields that we can reject full as well as partial
crowding–out effects, on average. In fact, public incentive schemes seem to
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accelerate the R&D spending in the business sector. In a second step, we
implement the results of the treatment effects analysis into a simple patent
production function, where R&D investment is disentangled into two com-
ponents: on one hand, the purely privately financed part of the total R&D
budget that firms would have spend in the absence of subsidies and, on the
other hand, the additionally induced R&D expenditure that is stimulated
by the subsidy (the sum of the subsidy itself and the additionally spent pri-
vate funds due to the receipt of subsidies). We find that both the purely
financed R&D and the estimated treatment effect show a positive impact
on the patenting behavior of firms. Hence, we do not have to reject the
presumed mechanism behind the European Action Plan. Public policy ini-
tiatives indeed foster the private R&D engagement, so that the meeting of
the Action Plan’s 3% goal can actually be promoted by public policy. Fur-
thermore, it contributes to the ultimate goal of the Action Plan, namely
to increase Europe’s technological performance, as the regression analysis
reveals that even the publicly stimulated additional R&D leads to an in-
creased patenting activity.
Of course, our study has a number of caveats that remain for further re-
search. First, we only consider Germany as an example of a European econ-
omy. It is questionable whether our results hold for other countries within
the European community. Second, patents are a measure of technological
performance. While patent indicators are a broadly accepted concept to
measure technological development, it is a narrow measure of innovative ac-
tivity, though. More general indicators, like successful innovations in terms
of sales with new products or cost reductions could serve as further indica-
tors of innovation outcome. Also employment growth as the ultimate goal
of the Action Plan would be a very interesting extension of our study. How-
ever, we chose patents due to the cross–sectional nature of our data, as they
should be the closest outcome indicator to the actual research projects with
respect to timing. Although our analysis would also benefit from the avail-
ability of panel data to control for individual fixed effects, it is a necessary
precondition for analyzes targeting the broader measures of innovation out-
come or employment as the ultimate success factor. In those cases, one had
to allow for longer lags between the research and perceptible effects on the
product or labor market.
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